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10.1126/sciadv.1600451Humans display a reduced set of consistent
behavioral phenotypes in dyadic games
Julia Poncela-Casasnovas,1 Mario Gutiérrez-Roig,2 Carlos Gracia-Lázaro,3 Julian Vicens,1,4 Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes,3,5
Josep Perelló,2,6 Yamir Moreno,3,7,8 Jordi Duch,1 Angel Sánchez3,9,10*Socially relevant situations that involve strategic interactions are widespread among animals and humans alike. To
study these situations, theoretical and experimental research has adopted a game theoretical perspective, generating
valuable insights about human behavior. However, most of the results reported so far have been obtained from a
population perspective and considered one specific conflicting situation at a time. This makes it difficult to extract
conclusions about the consistency of individuals’ behavior when facing different situations and to define a compre-
hensive classification of the strategies underlying the observed behaviors. We present the results of a lab-in-the-
field experiment in which subjects face four different dyadic games, with the aim of establishing general behavioral
rules dictating individuals’ actions. By analyzing our datawith an unsupervised clustering algorithm,we find that all
the subjects conform, with a large degree of consistency, to a limited number of behavioral phenotypes (envious,
optimist, pessimist, and trustful), with only a small fraction of undefined subjects. We also discuss the possible con-
nections to existing interpretations based on a priori theoretical approaches. Our findings provide a relevant
contribution to the experimental and theoretical efforts toward the identification of basic behavioral phenotypes
in a wider set of contexts without aprioristic assumptions regarding the rules or strategies behind actions. From
this perspective, our work contributes to a fact-based approach to the study of human behavior in strategic sit-
uations, which could be applied to simulating societies, policy-making scenario building, and even a variety of
business applications.INTRODUCTIONMany situations in life entail social interactions where the parties
involved behave strategically; that is, they take into consideration the
anticipated responses of actors who might otherwise have an impact
on an outcome of interest. Examples of these interactions include social
dilemmas where individuals face a conflict between self and collective
interests, which can also be seen as a conflict between rational and ir-
rational decisions (1–3), as well as coordination games where all parties
are rewarded for making mutually consistent decisions (4). These and
related scenarios are commonly studied in economics, psychology, po-
litical science, and sociology, typically using a game theoretic framework
to understand how decision-makers approach conflict and cooperation
under highly simplified conditions (5–7).
Extensive work has shown that, when exposed to the constraints in-
troduced in game theory designs, people are often not “rational” in the
sense that they do not pursue exclusively self-interested objectives (8, 9).
This is especially clear in the case of prisoner’s dilemma (PD) games,
where rational choice theory predicts that players will always defect
but empirical observation shows that cooperation oftentimes occurs,
even in “one-shot” games where there is no expectation of future inter-action among the parties involved (8, 10). These findings beg the ques-
tion as to why players sometimes choose to cooperate despite incentives
not to do so. Are these choices a function of a person’s identity and
therefore consistent across different strategic settings? Do individuals
draw from a small repertoire of responses, and if so, what are the
conditions that lead them to choose one strategy over another?
Here, we attempt to shed light on these questions by focusing on a
wide class of simple dyadic games that capture two important features
of social interaction, namely, the temptation to free-ride and the risk
associated with cooperation (8, 11, 12). All are two-person, two-action
games in which participants decide simultaneously which of the two
actions they will take. Following previous literature, we classify partici-
pants’ set of choices as either cooperation, which we define as a choice
that promotes the general interest, or defection, a choice that serves an
actor’s self-interest at the expense of others.
The games used in our study include PD (13, 14), the stag hunt (SH)
(4), and the hawk-dove (15) or snowdrift (16) games (SGs). SH is a co-
ordination game in which there is a risk in choosing the best possible
option for both players: cooperating when the other party defects poses
serious consequences for the cooperator, whereas the defector faces less
extreme costs for noncooperation (17). SG is an anticoordination game
where one is tempted to defect, but participants face the highest penal-
ties if both players defect (18). In PD games, both tensions are present:
when a player defects, the counterpart faces the worst possible situation
if he or she cooperates, whereas in that case, the defector benefits more
than by cooperating.We also consider the harmony game (HG), where
the best individual and collective options coincide; therefore, there
should be no tensions present (19).
Several theoretical perspectives have sought to explain the seemingly
irrational behavior of actors during conflict and cooperation games.1 of 8
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entations (20–22), which focuses on how individuals divide resources
between self and others. This research avenue has found that individuals
tend to fall into certain categories such as individualistic (thinking only
about themselves), competitive (attempting to maximize the difference
between their own and the other’s payoff), cooperative (attempting to
maximize everyone’s outcome), and altruistic (sacrificing their own
benefits to help others). Relatedly, social preferences theory posits that
people’s utility functions often extend beyond their ownmaterial payoff
and may include considerations of aggregate welfare or inequity
aversion (23). Whereas theories of social orientation and social prefer-
ences assume intrinsic value differences between individuals, cognitive
hierarchy theory instead assumes that playersmake choices on the basis
of their predictions about the likely actions of other players, and as such,
the true differences between individuals come not from values but
rather from depth of strategic thought (24).
Oneway to arbitrate between existing theoretical paradigms is to use
within-subject experiments, where participants are exposed to a wide
variety of situations requiring strategic action. If individuals exhibit a
similar logic (and corresponding behavior) in different experimental
settings, this would provide a more robust empirical case for theories
that argue that strategic action stems from intrinsic values or social ori-
entation. By contrast, if participants’ strategic behavior depends on the
incentive structure afforded by the social context, these findings would
pose a direct challenge to the idea that social values drive strategic
choices.
We therefore contribute to the literature on decision-making in
three important ways. First, we expose the same participants tomultiple
games with different incentive structures to assess the extent to which
strategies stem from stable characteristics of an individual. Second, we
depart from existing paradigms by not starting from an a priori classi-
fication to analyze our experimental data. For instance, empirical
studies have typically used classifications schemes that were first derived
from theory, making it difficult to determine whether these classifica-
tions are the best fit for the available data.We address this issue by using
an unsupervised, robust classification algorithm to identify the full set of
“strategic phenotypes” that constitute the repertoire of choices among
individuals in our sample. Finally, we advance research that documents
the profiles of cooperative phenotypes (25) by expanding the range of
human behaviors that may fall into similar types of classification. By
focusing on both cooperation and defection, this approach allows us
tomake contributions toward a taxonomy of human behaviors (26, 27).RESULTS
Laboratory-in-the-field experiment
We recruited 541 subjects of different ages, educational level, and social
status during a fair in Barcelona (see Materials and Methods) (28). The
experiment consisted of multiple rounds, in which participants were
randomly assigned partners and assigned randomly chosen payoff
values, allowing us to study the behavior of the same subject in a variety
of dyadic games including PD, SH, SG, and HG, with different payoffs.
To incentivize the experimental subjects’ decisions with real material
(economic) consequences, they were informed that they would propor-
tionally receive lottery tickets (one ticket per 40 points; the modal num-
ber of tickets earnedwas two) to the payoff they accumulated during the
rounds of dyadic games they played. The prize in the correspondingPoncela-Casasnovas et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1600451 5 August 2016lottery was four coupons redeemable at participating neighboring
stores, worth 50 euros each. The payoff matrices shown to the partici-
pants had the following form (rows are participant’s strategies, whereas
columns are those of the opponent)
C D
C
D
R S
T P
 
ð1Þ
Actions C and D were coded as two randomly chosen colors in the
experiment to avoid framing effects. R and P were always set to R = 10
andP= 5, whereasT and S took valuesT∈ {5, 6,…, 15} and S ∈ {0, 1,…,
10}. In thisway, the (T, S) plane can be divided into four quadrants, each
one corresponding to a different game depending on the relative order
of the payoffs: HG (S > P, R > T), SG (T > R > S > P), SH (R > T > P > S),
and PD (T > R > P > S). Matrices were generated with equal probability
for each point in the (T, S) plane, which was discretized as a lattice of
11 × 11 sites. Points in the boundaries between games, at the boundary
of our game space, or in its center do not correspond to the four basic
games previously described. However, we kept those points to add
generality to our exploration, and in any event, we made sure in the
analysis that the results did not change even if we removed those spe-
cial games (see below). For reference, see Fig. 1 (middle) for the Nash
(symmetric) equilibrium structure of each one of these games.
Population-level behavior
The average level of cooperation aggregated over all games and subjects
is 〈C〉 = 0.49 ± 0.01, where the error corresponds to a 95% confidence
interval (we apply this rule to the rest of our results, unless otherwise
specified). This is in agreement with the theoretically expected value,
〈C〉theo = 0.5, calculated by averaging over all the symmetric Nash
equilibria for the (T, S) values analyzed. However, the aggregate coop-
eration heatmap looks very different from what would be obtained by
simulating a population of players on a well-mixed scenario (compare
right and central panels in Fig. 1).
On the other hand, the experimental levels of cooperation per game
(excluding the boundaries between them, so the points strictly corre-
spond to one of the four games) are as follows: 〈C〉PD = 0.29 ± 0.02
(〈C〉theoPD ¼ 0), 〈C〉SG = 0.40 ± 0.02 (〈C〉theoSG ¼ 0:5), 〈C〉SH = 0.46 ±
0.02 (〈C〉theoSH ¼ 0:5), and 〈C〉HG = 0.80 ± 0.02 (〈C〉theoHG ¼ 1). The values
are considerably different from the theoretical ones in all cases, partic-
ularly for PD and HG.
Emergence of phenotypes
After looking at the behavior at the population level, we focus on the
analysis of the decisions at the individual level (27). Our goal is to assess
whether individuals behave in a highly idiosyncratic manner or wheth-
er, on the contrary, there are only a few “phenotypes” by which all our
experimental subjects can be classified. To this aim,we characterize each
subject with a four-dimensional vector where each dimension repre-
sents a subject’s average level of cooperation in each of the four
quadrants in the (T, S) plane. Then, we apply an unsupervised clustering
procedure, the K-means clustering algorithm (29), to group those indi-
viduals that have similar behaviors, that is, the values in their vectors are
similar. Input for this algorithm (see section S4.7) is the number of
clusters k, which is yet to be determined, and this algorithm groups
the data in such a way that it both minimizes the dispersion within2 of 8
R E S EARCH ART I C L Eclusters and maximizes the distance among centroids of different
clusters. We found that k = 5 clusters is the optimal number of
groups according to the Davies-Bouldin index (see section S4.8)
(30), which does not assume beforehand any specific number of
types of behaviors.
The results of the clustering analysis (Fig. 2) show that there is a
group that mostly cooperates in HG, a second group that cooperates
in both HG and SG, and a third one that cooperates in both HG and
SH. Players in the fourth group cooperate in all games, and finally, we
find a small group who seems to randomly cooperate almost
everywhere, with a probability of approximately 0.5.
To obtain a better understanding of the behavior of these five groups,
we represent the different types of behavior in a heatmap (Fig. 3) to ex-Poncela-Casasnovas et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1600451 5 August 2016tract characteristic behavioral rules. In this respect, it is important to
note that Fig. 3 provides a complementary view of the clustering results:
our clustering analysis was carried out attending only to the aggregate
cooperation level per quadrant, that is, to four numbers or coordinates
per subject, whereas this plot shows the average number of times the
players in each group cooperated for every point in the space of games.
The cooperation heatmaps in Fig. 3 show that there are common
characteristics of subjects classified in the same group even when
looking at every point of the (T, S) plane. The first two columns in
Fig. 3 display consistently different behaviors in coordination and anti-
coordination games, although they both act as prescribed by the Nash
equlibrium in PD andHG. Both groups are amenable to a simple inter-
pretation that links them to well-known behaviors in economic theory.5  7  9  11  13  15
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Fig. 1. Summary of the games used in the experiment and their equilibria. Schema with labels to help identify each one of the games in the
quadrants of the (T, S) plane (left), along with the symmetric Nash equilibria (center) and average empirical cooperation heatmaps from the 8366 game
actions of the 541 subjects (right), in each cell of the (T, S) plane. The symmetric Nash equilibria (center) for each game are as follows: PD and HG have one
equilibrium, given by the pure strategiesD and C, respectively. SG has a stablemixed equilibrium containing both cooperators and defectors, in a proportion
that depends on the specific payoffs considered. SH is a coordination game displaying two pure-strategy stable equilibria, whose bases of attraction are
separated by an unstable one, again depending on the particular payoffs of the game (5, 6, 43). The fraction of cooperation is color-coded (red, full
cooperation; blue, full defection).Fig. 2. Results from the K-means clustering algorithm. For every cluster, a column represents a player belonging to his or her corresponding cluster,
whereas the four rows indicate the four average cooperation values associatedwith his or her (from top to bottom: cooperation inHG, SG, SH, andPDgames).
We color-coded the average level of cooperation for eachplayer in eachgame (blue, 0.0; red, 1.0),whereas the lack of value in aparticular game for a particular
player is coded inwhite. Cluster sizes: Envious, n=161 (30%); Pessimist, n=113 (21%); Undefined, n=66 (12%); Optimist, n=110 (20%); Trustful, n= 90 (17%).3 of 8
R E S EARCH ART I C L EThus, the first phenotype (n = 110 or 20% of the population) cooperates
wherever T < R (that is, they cooperate in the HG and in the SH and
defect otherwise). By using this strategy, these subjects aim to obtain the
maximum payoff without taking into account the likelihood that their
counterpart will allow them to get it, in agreement with a maximax be-
havior (31). Accordingly, we call this first phenotype “optimists.” Con-
versely, we label subjects in the second phenotype “pessimists” (n = 113
or 21% of the population) because they use a maximin principle (32) to
choose their actions, cooperating only when S > P (that is, in HG and
SG) to ensure a best worst-case scenario. The behaviors of these two
phenotypes, which can hardly be considered rational [as discussed by
Colman (31)], are also associated with different degrees of risk aversion,
a question that will be addressed below.
Regarding the third column in Fig. 3, it is apparent from the plots
that individuals in this phenotype (n = 161 or 30% of the population)
exclusively cooperate in the upper triangle of HG [that is, wherever
(S − T) ≥ 0]. As was the case with optimists and pessimists, this third
behavior is far from being rational in a self-centered sense, in so far as
players forsake the possibility of achieving the maximum payoff by
playing the only Nash equilibrium in HG. In turn, these subjects seem
to behave as driven by envy, status-seeking consideration, or lack of
trust. By choosing D when S > P and R > T, these players prevent their
counterparts from receiving more payoff than themselves even when,
by doing so, they diminish their own potential payoff. The fact that
competitiveness overcomes rationality as players basically attempt to
ensure they receivemore payoff than their opponents suggests an inter-
pretation of the game as an assurance game (3), and accordingly, we
have dubbed this phenotype “envious.”
The fourth phenotype (fourth column in Fig. 3) includes those
players who cooperate in almost every round and in almost every sitePoncela-Casasnovas et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1600451 5 August 2016of the (T, S) plane (n = 90 or 17% of the population). In this case, and
opposite to the previous one, we believe that these players’ behavior can
be associated with trust in partners behaving in a cooperative manner.
Another way of looking at trust in this context is in terms of expecta-
tions, because it has been shown that expectationof cooperation enhances
cooperation in the PD (33). In any event, explaining the roots of this type
of cooperative behavior in a unique manner seems to be a difficult task,
and alternative explanations of cooperation on the PD involving normal-
ized measures of greed and fear (34) or up to five simultaneous factors
(35) have been advanced too. Lacking an unambiguousmotivation of the
observed actions of the subjects in this group, we find the name “trustful”
to be an appropriate one to refer to this phenotype. Last, the unsupervised
algorithm found a small fifth group of players (n = 66 or 12% of the pop-
ulation) who cooperate in an approximately random manner, with a
probability of 0.5, in any situation. For lack of better insight into their
behavior, we will hereinafter refer to this minority as “undefined.”
Remarkably, three of the phenotypes reported here (optimist, pessi-
mist, and trustful) are of a very similar size. On the other hand, the largest
one is the envious phenotype, including almost a third of the participants,
whereas the undefined group, which we cannot yet consider as a bona
fide phenotype because we have not found any interpretation of the cor-
responding subjects’ actions, is considerably smaller than all the others.
In agreement with abundant experimental evidence, we have not found
any purely rational phenotype: the strategies used by the four relevant
groups are, to different extents, quite far from self-centered rationality.
Note that ours is an across-game characterization, which does not ex-
clude the possibility of subjects taking rational, purely self-regarding
decisions when restricted to one specific game (see section S4.5).
Finally, and to shed more light on the phenotypes found above, we
estimate an indirect measure of their risk aversion. To do this, weFig. 3. Summary results of the different phenotypes (Optimist, Pessimist, Envious, Trustful, and Undefined) determined by the K-means clustering
algorithm,plus theaggregationofallphenotypes. For eachphenotype (column),we showtheworddescriptionof thebehavioral rule and thecorresponding
inferred behavior in the whole (T, S) plane (labeled as Numerical). The fraction of cooperation is color-coded (red, full cooperation; blue, full defection). The last
row (labeled as Experiment) shows the average cooperation, aggregating all the decisions taken by the subjects classified in each cluster. The fractions for each
phenotypeare as follows: 20%Optimist, 21%Pessimist, 30%Envious, 17%Trustful, and12%Undefined. Thevery last columnshows theaggregatedheatmapsof
cooperation for both the simulations and the experimental results. The simulation results assume that each individual plays using one and only one of the
behavioral rules and respects the relative fractions of each phenotype in the population found by the algorithm. Note the agreement between aggregated
experimental and aggregated numerical heatmaps (the discrepancy heatmap between them is shown in section S4.11). We report that the average difference
across the entire (T, S) plane between the experiment and the phenotype aggregation is of 1.39 SD units, which represents a value inside the standard 95%
confidence interval, whereas for any given phenotype, this difference averaged over the entire (T, S) plane is smaller than 2.14 SD units.4 of 8
R E S EARCH ART I C L Econsider the number of cooperative actions in SG together with the num-
ber of defective actions in SH (over the total sum of actions in both
quadrants for a given player; see section S4.5). Whereas envious, trustful,
and undefined players exhibit intermediate levels of risk aversion (0.52,
0.52, and 0.54, respectively), pessimists exhibit significantly higher value
(0.73), consistent with their fear of facing the worst possible outcome and
their choice of the best worst-case scenario. In contrast, the optimist
phenotype shows a very low risk aversion (0.32), in agreement with
the fact that they aim to obtain the maximum possible payoff, taking
the risk that their counterpart does not work with them toward that goal.
Robustness of phenotypes
Wehave carefully checked that ourK-means clustering results are robust.
Lacking the “ground truth” behind our data in terms of different types of
individual behaviors, we must test the significance and robustness of our
clustering analysis by checking its dependence on the data set itself. We
studied this issue in several complementary manners. First, we applied
the same algorithm to a randomized version of our data set (preserving
the total number of cooperative actions in the population but destroying
any correlation among the actions of any given subject), showing no sig-
nificant clustering structure at all (see section S4.7 for details).
Second, we ran theK-means clustering algorithm on portions of the
original data with the so-called “leave-p-out” procedure (36). This test
showed that the optimum five-cluster scheme found is robust even
when randomly excluding up to 55% of the players and their actions
(see section S4.7 for details). Moreover, we repeated the whole analysis,
discarding the first two choices made by every player, to account for
excessive noise due to initial lack of experience; the results more clearly
show even the same optimum at five phenotypes. See section S4.7 for a
complete discussion.
Third, we tested the consistency among cluster structures found in
different runs of the same algorithm for a fixed number of clusters, that
is to say, how likely it is that the particular composition of individuals in
the cluster scheme from one realization of the algorithm is correlated
with the composition from that of a different realization. To ascertain
this, we computed the normalized mutual information score MI (see
section S4.9 for formal definition) (37), knowing that the comparison
of two runs with exactly the same clustering composition would give a
value MI = 1 (perfect correlation), and MI = 0 would correspond to a
total lack of correlation between them. We ran our K-means clustering
algorithm 2000 times for the optimum k = 5 clusters and paired the
clustering schemes for comparison, obtaining an average normalized
mutual information score ofMI=0.97 (SD, 0.03). To put these numbers
in perspective, the same score for the pairwise comparison of results
from 2000 realizations of the algorithm on the randomized version of
the data is MI = 0.59 (SD, 0.18) (see section S4.9 for more details).
All the tests presented above provide strong support for our classi-
fication in terms of phenotypes. However, we also searched for possible
dependencies of the phenotype classification on the age and gender dis-
tributions for each group (see section S4.10), and we found no signifi-
cant differences among them, which hints toward a classification of
behaviors (phenotypes) beyond demographic explanations.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have presented the results of a laboratory-in-the-field experiment
designed to identify phenotypes, following the terminology fittingly in-Poncela-Casasnovas et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1600451 5 August 2016troduced by Peysakhovich et al. (25). Our results suggest that the indi-
vidual behaviors of the subjects in our population can be described by a
small set of phenotypes: envious, optimist, pessimist, trustful, and a
small group of individuals referred to as undefined, who play an un-
known strategy. The relevance of this repertoire of phenotypes arises
from the fact that it has been obtained from experiments in which
subjects played a wide variety of dyadic games through an unsupervised
procedure, theK-means clustering algorithm, and that it is a very robust
classification. With this technique, we can go beyond correlations and
assign specific individuals to specific phenotypes, instead of looking at
(aggregate) population data. In this respect, the trimodal distributions of
the joint cooperation probability found by Capraro et al. (38) show
much resemblance to our findings, and although a direct comparison
is not possible because they correspond to aggregate data, they point in
the direction of a similar phenotype classification. In addition, our re-
sults contribute to the currently available evidence that people are het-
erogeneous, by quantifying the degree of heterogeneity, in terms of both
the number of types and their relative frequency, in a specific (but broad)
suite of games.
Although the robustness of our agnostic identification of phenotypes
makes us confident of the relevance of the behavioral classification, and
our interpretation of it is clear and plausible, it is not the only possible
one. It is important to point out that connections can also be drawn to
earlier attempts to classify individual behaviors. As we have mentioned
previously, one theory that may also shed light on our classification is
that of social value orientation (20–22). Thus, the envious type may be
related to the competitive behavior found in that context (although in
our observation, envious people just aim at making more profit than
their competitors, not necessarily minimizing their competitors’ profit);
optimists could be cooperative, and trustful seem very close to altruistic.
As for the pessimist phenotype, we have not been able to draw a clear
relationship to the typesmost commonly found among social value ori-
entations, but in any event, the similarity between the two classifica-
tions is appealing and suggests an interesting line for further research.
Another alternative view on our findings arises from social preferences
theory (23), where, for instance, envy can be understood as the case in
which inequality that is advantageous to self yields a positive contribu-
tion to one’s utility (39–42). Altruists can be viewed as subjects with
concerns for social welfare (39), whereas other phenotypes are difficult
to be understood in this framework, and optimists and pessimists do
not seem to care about their partner’s outcome. However, other inter-
pretations may apply to these cases: optimists could be players strongly
influenced by payoff dominance a la Harsanyi and Selten (43), in the
sense that these players would choose strategies associated with the
best possible payoff for both. Yet, another view on this phenotype is that
of team reasoning (44–46), namely, individuals whose strategies maxi-
mize the collective payoff of the player pair if this strategy profile is
unique. Proposals such as the cognitive hierarchy theory (24, 47) and
the level-k theory (48, 49) do not seem to fit our results in so far as the
best response to the undefined phenotype, which would be the zeroth
level of behavior, does not match any of our behavioral classes.
Our results open the door to making relevant advances in a number
of directions. For instance, they point to the independence of the phe-
notypic classification of age and gender. Although the lack of gender
dependence may not be surprising, it would be really astonishing that
small children would exhibit behaviors with similar classifications in
view of the body of experimental evidence about their differences from
adults (50–55), and further research is needed to assess this issue in5 of 8
R E S EARCH ART I C L Edetail. As discussed also by Peysakhovich et al. (25), our research does
not illuminate whether the different phenotypes are born, made, or
something in between, and thus, understanding their origin would
be a far-reaching result.
We believe that applying an approach similar to ours to obtain
results about the cooperative phenotype (25, 38, 56) and, even better,
to carry out experiments with an ample suite of games, as well as a
detailed questionnaire (57), is key in future research. In this regard, it
has to be noted that the relationship between our automatically identi-
fied phenotypes and theories of economic behavior yields predictions
about other games: envy and expectations about the future and about
other players will dictate certain behaviors in many other situations.
Therefore, our classification here can be tested and refined by looking
for phenotypes arising in different contexts. This could be complemented
with a comparison of our unsupervised algorithm with the parametric
modeling approach by Cabrales (41) or even by implementing flexible
specifications to social preferences (23, 39, 40) or social value orientation
(20–22) to improve the understanding of our behavioral phenotypes.
Finally, our results also have implications in policy-making and real-
life economic interactions. For instance, there is a large group of individ-
uals, the envious ones (about a third of the population), that in situations
such as HG fail to cooperate when they are at risk of being left with
lower payoff than their counterpart. This points to the difficulty of
making people understand when they face a nondilemmatic, win-win
situation, and that effortmust be expended tomake this very clear.Other
interesting subpopulations are those of the pessimist and optimist phe-
notypes, which together amount to approximately half of the popula-
tion. These people exhibit large or small risk aversion, respectively, and
use an ego-centered approach in their daily lives, thus ignoring that
others can improve or harm their expected benefit with highly un-
desirable consequences. A final example of the hints provided by our
results is the existence of an unpredictable fraction of the population
(undefined) that, even being small, can have a strong influence on social
interactions because its noisy behavior could lead people with more
clear heuristics to mimic its erratic actions. On the other hand, the clas-
sification in terms of phenotypes (particularly if, as we show here, it
comprises only a few different types) can be very useful for firms,
companies, or banks interactingwith people: it could be used to evaluate
customers or potential ones or even employees formanagerial purposes,
allowing for a more efficient handling of the human resources in large
organizations. This approach is also very valuable in the emergent de-
liberative democracy and open-government practices around the globe
[including the Behavioural Insights Team (58) of the UK government,
its recently established counterpart at the White House or the World
Health Organization (59)]. Research following the lines presented here
could lead to many innovations in these contexts.MATERIALS AND METHODS
The experiment was conducted as a lab-in-the-field, that is, to avoid
restricting ourselves to the typical samples of university undergraduate
students, we took our laboratory to a festival in Barcelona and recruited
subjects from the general audience (28). This setup allows, at the very
least, to obtain results from a very wide age range, as was the case in a
previous study where it was found that teenagers behave differently
(55). All participants in the experiment signed an informed consent
to participate. In agreement with the Spanish Law for Personal DataPoncela-Casasnovas et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1600451 5 August 2016Protection, no association was ever made between their real names
and the results. This procedure was checked and approved by the Vice-
provost of Research of Universidad Carlos III deMadrid, the institution
funding the experiment.
To equally cover the four dyadic games in our experiments, we dis-
cretized the (T, S) plane as a lattice of 11 × 11 sites. Each player was
equipped with a tablet running the application of the experiment (see
section S1 for technical details and section S2 for the experiment
protocol). The participants were shown a brief tutorial in the tablet
(see the translation of the tutorial in section S3) but were not instructed
in any particular way nor with any particular goal in mind. They were
informed that they had to make decisions in different conditions and
against different opponents in every round. They were not informed
about how many rounds of the game they were going to play. Because
of practical limitations, we could only simultaneously host around
25 players, so the experiment was conducted in several sessions over a
period of 2 days. In every session, all individuals played a different,
randomly picked number of rounds between 13 and 18. In each round
of a session, each participantwas randomly assigned a different opponent
and a payoff matrix corresponding to a different (T, S) point among
our 11 × 11 different games. Couples and payoffmatrices were random-
ized in each new round, and players did not know the identity of their
opponents. In case there was an odd number of players or a given player
was nonresponsive, the experimental software took over and made the
game decision for him or her, accordingly labeling its corresponding
data to discard actions in the analysis (143 actions). When the action
was actually carried out by the software, the stipulation was that it re-
peated the previous choice of C or D with an 80% probability. In the
three cases where a session had an odd number of participants, it has
to be noted that no subjects played all the time against the software,
because assigning of partners was randomized for every round. The
total number of participants in our experiment was 541, adding up to
a total of 8366 game decisions collected, with an average number of
actions per (T, S) value of 69.1 (see also section S4.3).SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/2/8/e1600451/DC1
Technical implementation of the experiment
Running the experiment
Translated transcript of the tutorial and feedback screen after each round
Other experimental results
fig. S1. System architecture.
fig. S2. Age distribution of the participants in our experiment.
fig. S3. Screenshots of the tutorial shown to participants before starting the experiment and
feedback screen after a typical round of the game.
fig. S4. Fraction of cooperative actions for young (≤15 years old) and adult players (>16 years
old) and relative difference between the two heatmaps: (young − adults)/adults.
fig. S5. Fraction of separate cooperative actions for males and females and relative difference
between the two heatmaps: (males − females)/females.
fig. S6. Fraction of cooperative actions separated by round number: for the first 1 to 3 rounds,
4 to 10 rounds, and last 11 to 18 rounds.
fig. S7. Relative difference in the fraction of cooperation heatmaps between groups of rounds.
fig. S8. Total number of actions in each point of the (T,S) plane for all 541 participants in the
experiment (the total number of game actions in the experiment adds up to 8366).
fig. S9. SEM fraction of cooperative actions in each point of the (T,S) plane for all the
participants in the experiment.
fig. S10. Average fraction of cooperative actions (and SEM) among the population as a
function of the round number overall (left) and separating the actions by game (right).
fig. S11. Distribution of fraction of rational actions among the 541 subjects of our experiment,
when considering only their actions in HG or PD, or both.6 of 8
R E S EARCH ART I C L Efig. S12. Fraction of rational actions as a function of the round number for the 541 subjects,
defined by their actions in the PD game and HG together (top) and independently (bottom).
fig. S13. Values of risk aversion averaged over the subjects in each phenotype.
fig. S14. Average response times (and SEM) as a function of the round number for all the
participants in the experiment and separating the actions into cooperation or defection.
fig. S15. Distributions of response times for all the participants in the experiment and
separating the actions into cooperation (top) and defection (bottom).
fig. S16. Testing the robustness of the results from the K-means algorithm.
fig. S17. Davies-Bouldin index as a function of the number of clusters in the partition of our
data (dashed black) compared to the equivalent results for different leave-p-out analyses.
fig. S18. Average value for the normalized mutual information score, when doing pairwise
comparisons of the clustering schemes from 2000 independent runs of the K-means
algorithm both on the actual data and on the randomized version of the data.
fig. S19. Age distribution for the different phenotypes compared to the distribution of the
whole population (black).
fig. S20. Difference between the experimental (second row) and numerical (or inferred; first
row) behavioral heatmaps for each one of the phenotypes found by the K-means clustering
algorithm, in units of SD.
fig. S21. Average level of cooperation over all game actions and for different values of T (in
different colors).
fig. S22. Average level of cooperation as a function of (T,S) for both hypothesis and experiment.REFERENCES AND NOTES
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